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Abstract
The literature traditionally assumes that a portfolio manager who expends costly
effort to generate information makes an unrestricted portfolio choice and is paid
according to a sharing rule. However, the revelation principle provides a more
efficient institution. If credible communication of the signal is possible, then the
optimal contract restricts portfolio choice and pays the manager a fraction of a
benchmark plus a bonus proportional to performance relative to the benchmark. If
credible communication is not possible, an additional incentive to report extreme
signals may be required to remove a possible incentive to underprovide effort and
feign a neutral signal.
The appropriate evaluation and compensation of portfolio managers is an ongo-
ing topic of debate among practitioners and regulators. Although performance
measurement and optimal managerial contracting are two sides of the same coin,
the academic literature has largely considered the two questions separately. Typ-
ically, performance measurement has been studied in the context of models with
realistic security returns but no consideration of the incentives created by the mea-
sure. Optimal contracting has been studied in information models with careful
consideration of incentives but simplistic models of portfolio choice and security
returns. This paper derives optimal contracts for portfolio managers in the tradi-
tion of agency theory1 but uses a rich model of security returns with full spanning
of market states.
This paper’s model is not a model of screening managers by ability as in Bhat-
tacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), and in fact the manager’s ability is common knowl-
edge from the outset. Rather, there is moral hazard in information production. The
manager can expend effort to influence the precision of a private signal about fu-
ture market prices. The investor’s problem is to find a contract for the manager
that provides incentives to take costly effort and to use the signal in the investor’s
interest while still sharing risk reasonably efficiently. In a similar vein, absence
of any information asymmetry at the outset distinguishes us from Garcia (2001),
whose managers already know their signals at the time of contracting.
Negative results appear to be more common in this literature than positive ones.
Stoughton (1993) examines affine (linear plus a constant) and quadratic contracts
in a two-asset world. He finds that affine contracts provide no incentives for effort.
Quadratic contracts provide some incentive but are not optimal due to their poor
risk sharing properties.2 Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) contains a similar result
1See Ross (1973). For a survey of the agency literature see Laffont and Martimort (2002) or
Stole (1993).
2There is a claim in Stoughton (1993) that quadratic contracts approach the first-best in the
limit as the investor becomes risk neutral. This claim is incorrect. The sense of convergence
(small difference in utility) to the first-best as the client becomes less risk averse is not robust
to different utility representations. Using a more reasonable sense of convergence measured by
certainty-equivalent, one can demonstrate that the contracts do not approach first-best. Specif-
ically, the investor’s utility is UB(w) = − exp(−bw) and therefore the certainty equivalent is
the inverse of this function CE(u) = − log(−u)/b. Then we can compute from (29) and (30) in
Stoughton (1993) (using also (4)), that the difference in certainty equivalents for small b is approx-
imately − log(1− 2aγ2/H)/(2a), which is a positive constant. Under that paper’s normalization,
the utility function converges uniformly to zero as risk aversion increases, and consequently any
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to Stoughton’s result for affine contracts. There it is shown that contracts which
are affine in the excess return over a benchmark also provide no incentives to take
costly effort. These negative results arise from an assumption that the contracts
do not restrict the portfolio choice of the manager, as would a general contract
under the revelation principle.3 Restrictions on the manager’s portfolio choice are
essential for incentive pay schemes to induce effort. Unrestricted trading may al-
low a manager to completely undo the incentive effects of the fee. Our analysis
shows that an optimal contract specifies not only the fee schedule for the agent
but also a menu of allowable portfolio strategies.4 This form of contract can be
motivated by the revelation principle, and the revelation principle also tells us that
this form of contract is general in the sense that it can replicate the equilibrium
allocation of any other contract. Actual investment guidelines are full of portfolio
restrictions. Common restrictions on asset allocation include restrictions on the
universe of assets and ranges for proportions in the various assets; while common
restrictions for management within an asset class are limitations on market capi-
talization or style (growth versus income) of stocks, credit ratings or durations of
bonds, restrictions on use of derivatives, maximum allocations to a stock or in-
dustry, and increasingly portfolio risk measures such as duration, beta, or tracking
error. Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2001) documents the prevalence
of such restrictions in contracts observed in the mutual fund industry.
We derive optimal contracts given a mixture assumption under which the joint
distribution of the manager’s signal and the market state depends affinely on the
effort of the manager. We also assume that both the investor and the manager have
log utility. In a first-best world, where the manager’s effort is contractible, the
optimal contract is a proportional sharing rule. In a second-best world, in which
the manager’s signal is observable but his effort is not contractible, the optimal
fee for the manager is a proportion of the managed portfolio plus a share of the
excess return of the portfolio over a (endogenously determined) benchmark. This
bounded payoff would be considered asymptotically first-best. For example, if giving the manager
100% of the portfolio value satisfies the participation constraint, it is also asymptotically first-best
in that sense. Obviously that is a meaningless sense of convergence.
3Go´mez and Sharma (2001) have shown that these non-incentive results disappear when a
restriction on short-selling is imposed. Similarly, Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2003) show that
restricting the deviation from a benchmark can reduce the perverse incentives of an agent facing
an ad hoc convex objective (motivated by performance-linked future business).
4Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) proposition 5 does examine the effect of adding an affine port-
folio restriction to the model. However this restriction does not look like an optimal menu, nor
does it seem similar to portfolio restrictions observed in practice.
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gives the appropriate incentive to exert effort. The form of the optimal contract
suggests the use of excess return over a benchmark as a measure of portfolio
performance. Use of excess returns as a performance measure is common in the
portfolio management industry. Performance based fees, when they are observed,
are generally tied to this measure.
In a third-best world, neither the effort nor the signal is contractible, so addi-
tional adjustments are necessary to induce correct portfolio choice. Relative to
the second-best, the third-best contract rewards the manager for reporting more
extreme signals, or choosing riskier portfolios. This illustrates the limitations of
the second-best contract. With the second-best contract in a third-best world a
manager could not fully undo the incentives but could mitigate their effect by tak-
ing more conservative portfolio positions. The failure of the second-best contract
to discourage overly conservative strategies explains the concerns of practitioners
about “closet indexers,” managers who collect active management fees but adopt
passive strategies. In a third-best world the manager’s compensation is similar to
the second-best but with explicit rewards for taking risk.
Conceptually, our paper is very similar to Kihlstrom (1988). However the model
in that paper has only two market states and two signal states, so it does not admit
nonaffine contracts. With only two signal states there is also no way for a manager
to deviate slightly from the desired investment policy. The only choice is to take
the correct position or take the opposite position from what the signal would sug-
gest. So in this context the incentive to be overly conservative is not apparent. In
addition, the investor in the model of Kihlstrom (1988) is risk-neutral. This would
imply that no optimal contract exists except that Kihlstrom also assumes that the
manager cannot short. This leads to a corner solution.
Zender (1988) shows that the Jensen measure is the optimal affine contract in a
reduced-form model of a mean-variance world. The limitations of that paper are
that the mapping from effort to efficient portfolio is a black box and that it is
unclear what underlying model it is a reduced form for, or indeed whether the op-
timal contract in the reduced form is also optimal in the underlying model. Sung
(1995)5 and Ou-Yang (2003) analyze continuous-time models in which both the
drift and diffusion coefficient can be controlled, and affine contracts arise opti-
5The portfolio application is mentioned in Sung (1995) and spelled out in more detail in Sung’s
thesis, Sung (1991).
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mally. As in Zender (1988), the portfolio choice is a reduced form, and it is not
clear whether this is the reduced form for a reasonable underlying model.
Finally, although not a model of delegated portfolio management, the model of
delegated expertise of Demski and Sappington (1987) bears several similarities
to our model of this paper. In that paper an analyst exerts costly effort to obtain
information. The main differences between that paper and the current paper are
that the principal is risk-neutral and the sharing rule over the output is restricted
to depend only on output and not on the action taken or the signal observed by the
agent. Another model that does not consider portfolio management but is closely
related to our problem is Sung (2003), which has a continuous-time model with
both moral hazard and adverse selection.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the optimal contracting prob-
lem. Section II presents analytical solutions in the first-best and second-best cases
and discusses the problems which arise in the third-best case. Section III con-
cludes.
I The Agency Problem
We consider the contracting problem between an investor and a portfolio manager.
This is a moral hazard (or “hidden action”) problem because the investor cannot
observe the level of costly effort undertaken by the manager. But, it also includes
an adverse selection (or “hidden information”) problem because the costly effort
generates private information that the manager cannot necessarily be trusted to
use in the investor’s best interest. Our analysis takes the approach of contracting
theory and looks for an optimal contract without pre-supposing that the contract
conforms to known institutions or has any specific form. The optimal contract
derived in this way can be compared with practice or other contracts assumed by
other analyses, understanding that an equivalent contract may take a somewhat
different appearance.
There are a number of different technologies that can be used to minimize the
impact of information problems. For example, information problems can be min-
imized by using various forms of information gathering before-the-fact, informa-
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tion gathering after-the-fact, and, in a multi-period context, the impact of reputa-
tion on future business. Our analysis considers what can be done using contracting
and communication without these other technologies. We pose this in the typical
format of an agency problem (as in Ross (1973)), with allowance for a direct
mechanism in the signal reporting stage. Here are the assumptions of the model.
Market Returns Investments are made in a market that is complete over states
distinguished by security prices. Let ω ∈ Ω denote such a state and let p(ω) be
the pricing density for a claim that pays a dollar in state ω. The integrals used to
price payoffs or compute utilities may seem most familiar if the underlying states
ω (and s defined later) lie in<n for some n. However, the notation and derivations
are also consistent with a discrete state space if the measure is a counting mea-
sure (implying that the integrals are sums). The notation and derivations are also
consistent with a more complex state spaces (such as the set of paths of Brown-
ian motion) if integrals are taken with respect to a convenient reference measure.
The model is a one-period model in the sense that payoffs will be realized only
once, but we think of market completeness as being due to dynamic trading as in
a Black-Scholes world. Our agents are “small” and we assume that their trades
do not affect market prices. When the state space is not discrete, there may be a
technical issue of exactly what space the market is complete over, and we resolve
this issue by assuming that all claims are marketed for which the integral defining
the price exists and is finite.
Information Technology Through costly effort ε ∈ [0, 1], the manager has the
ability to generate information about the future market state in the form of a private
signal s ∈ S. Given effort ε,
(1) f(s, ω; ε) = εf I(s, ω) + (1− ε)fU(s, ω).
is the probability density of s and ω where the market state is ω and the signal
is s. Here, f I is an “informed” distribution and fU is an “uninformed” distribu-
tion. We assume that s and ω are independent in the uninformed distribution, i.e.,
fU(s, ω) = f s(s)fω(ω), the product of the marginal distributions. These marginal
distributions are assumed to be the same as for the informed distribution. For ω,
this must be true or else the manager’s effort choice could influence the market
return. For s, this is a normalization.
One interpretation of the mixture model is that the manager receives a signal that
may be informative or it may just be random, and that expending more effort
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makes it more likely the signal is informative. Using the mixture model would be
without loss of generality if there were only two effort levels, and it is a simple
sufficient condition for the first-order approach to work in many agency models,6
including our second-best problem. Perhaps most importantly, using a mixture
model avoids the pathological features of the more common assumption in fi-
nance that the agent chooses the precision of a normally distributed signal; with
this common assumption, the unbounded likelihood ratio in the tails makes it
too easy to create approximately first-best incentives, as pointed out by Mirrlees
(1974). In the mixture model, likelihood ratios are bounded. Besides justifying
the first-order approach (which simplifies exposition), our main use of the mixture
assumption is its implication that the benchmark appearing in the solution to the
second-best problem is the uninformed optimum. Absent the mixture assump-
tion, the form of the optimal compensation is the same but the benchmark loses
its simple interpretation.
Preferences Both the investor and the manager have logarithmic von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility of end-of-period consumption, and the manager also bears
a utility cost of expending effort. Specifically, the manager’s (agent’s) utility is
log(φ) − c(ε), where φ is the manager’s fee and c(ε) is the cost of the effort
ε (the hidden action). We shall assume that c(ε) is differentiable and convex
with c′(0) = 0. We will assume that all the problems we consider have optimal
solutions.7 The investor’s (principal’s) utility is log(V ), where V is the value of
what remains in the portfolio after the fee has been paid. Following Grossman and
Hart (1983), we will use utility levels rather than consumption levels as the choice
variables, which make most of the constraints affine. We will denote by ui(s, ω)
the investor’s equilibrium utility level log(V ) given s and ω, and we will denote
by um(s, ω) the manager’s equilibrium utility level for only the wealth component
log(φ) given s and ω.
6Rogerson (1985) attributes Holmstro¨m (1984) with pointing out the appeal of the mixture
model as an alternative to the more complex convexity condition of Mirrlees (1976). See also
Grossman and Hart (1983) and Hart and Holmstro¨m (1987).
7For the first-best problem with positive initial wealth, we have in essence a portfolio optimiza-
tion and an optimal solution exists under growth bounds on the tail probabilities of the state-price
density and the asymptotic marginal utility, as in Cox and Huang (1991) or Dybvig, Rogers, and
Back (1999). For the other problems, existence can fail in more subtle ways, for example, because
compensating the manager enough to induce effort never leaves enough wealth left over to meet
the investor’s minimum utility level. Or, there may be a closure problem in the second-best like
the forcing solution described by Mirrlees (1974) in first-best problems.
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Initial Wealth and Reservation Utility The investor’s initial wealth is w0, and
the manager does not have any initial wealth. The agency problem is formulated
as maximizing the investor’s utility subject to giving the manager a reservation
utility level of u0. We interpret the reservation utility level as the best the manager
can do in alternative employment. In an alternative interpretation, the reservation
utility level would be a parameter mapping out the efficient frontier in a bargain-
ing problem between the investor and the manager. Either way, the contracting
problem is the same.
Optimal Contracting The contracting problem looks at mechanisms that work in
this way. First, there is a contracting phase in which the investor offers a contract
to the manager. This contract specifies a portfolio strategy for each possible signal
realization and how the portfolio payoff is to be divided between the investor and
the manager. The manager either accepts or refuses the contract; in our formal
analysis this is handled as a constraint that says the investor must choose a con-
tract that the manager will be willing to accept. Once the contract is accepted,
the manager chooses effort ε and receives the private signal s. The manager an-
nounces the signal and the portfolio associated with the signal in the contract is
selected. Finally, portfolio returns are realized and the manager and the investor
get the payment described in the contract.
This specification of the problem has a signal announcement that may seem some-
what artificial. This is a direct mechanism, which according to the revelation prin-
ciple is guaranteed to duplicate all possible mechanisms, in effect if not in form.
Because of the private costly effort, our model does not conform to the traditional
derivation of the revelation principle, in which there is private information but
no private costly effort. Nonetheless, the revelation principle still works because
there are no private actions chosen after the signal is reported (the portfolio choice
is reasonably assumed to be public). The merit of looking at a direct mechanism
is that it allows us to find contracts that implement allocations that can be imple-
mented using the sharing rules traditionally studied in the literature as well as any
alternative institutions that may do better. The more general contracts also have a
nice economic interpretation in terms of restrictions on the investment strategy.
The search for an optimal contract is formalized as the solution of a choice prob-
lem that makes the investor as well off as possible subject to a budget constraint,
the manager’s reservation utility level, and incentive-compatibility of the choices
we are planning for the manager. We will look at several forms of the prob-
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lem. The third-best problem has the most profound difficulties with incentives
and requires the manager to have the incentive to select the costly effort and also
correctly reveal the observed signal.
Problem 1 (Third-best) Choose ui(s, ω), um(s, ω), and ε to maximize investor’s
expected utility,
(2)
∫∫
ui(s, ω)(εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds,
subject to the budget constraint,
(3) (∀s ∈ S)
∫
(exp(ui(s, ω)) + exp(um(s, ω))) p(ω)dω = w0,
the participation constraint,
(4)
∫∫
um(s, ω)(εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε) = u0,
and incentive-compatibility of effort and signal reporting,
(∀ε′ ∈ E and ρ : S → S)(5) ∫∫
um(s, ω)(εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε)
≥
∫∫
um(ρ(s), ω)(ε
′f I(ω|s) + (1− ε′)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε′).
In the choice problem, the choice variables are the effort level ε and the utility lev-
els for investor and manager in each contingency (s, ω). The objective function
is expected utility for the investor as computed from the investor’s utility level
in each contingency and the joint distribution of s and ω given the effort level
ε. The budget constraint computes the consumptions for investor and manager
from their utility levels (the exponential function is the inverse of the logarithm)
and values it using the pricing rule p(ω). There is a separate budget constraint
given each signal realization because there are no opportunities to hedge con-
sumption across signal realizations. The pricing is the same for each s because
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of the “small investor” assumption that the manager does not affect pricing in se-
curity markets. The participation constraint says that the agent has to be treated
well enough to meet the reservation utility level u0 of outside opportunities. Fi-
nally, the incentive-compatibility condition says that the manager wants to do as is
planned and would not be better off selecting a different level of effort (ε′ instead
of ε) and/or misreporting states (reporting ρ(s) instead of s).
The second-best problem assumes that signal reporting is not a problem but that
incentive for effort may be, so the constraint for incentive-compatibility of effort
and signal reporting is replaced by a constraint for incentive-compatibility of ef-
fort only. This is consistent with an assumption that there is monitoring of the
process that ensures the information will be used as intended, or with an assump-
tion that the incentives to misuse the information are handled another way, for
example, through loss of business due to a reputation for being a “closet indexer”
who collects fees as an active manager but actually chooses a portfolio close to
the index.
Problem 2 (Second-best) Choose ui(s, ω), um(s, ω), and ε to maximize investor’s
expected utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3), the participation con-
straint (4), and incentive-compatibility of effort
(∀ε′ ∈ E)(6) ∫∫
um(s, ω)(εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε)
≥
∫∫
um(s, ω)(ε
′f I(ω|s) + (1− ε′)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε′).
And, in the first-best, there is assumed to be no incentive problem for inducing
the appropriate effort and reporting, although there is still a problem of allocat-
ing scarce resources efficiently to do as well as possible for the investor while
satisfying the manager’s minimum requirment as given in the reservation utility
constraint. The first-best is not realistic but it is a useful ideal benchmark.
Problem 3 (First-best) Choose ui(s, ω), um(s, ω), and ε to maximize investor’s
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expected utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3), and the participation con-
straint (4).
We can reduce both the number of choice variables and the number of constraints
by use of the following lemma, which enables us to use as the objective the in-
vestor’s indirect utility, which equals the optimal value for the investor given the
investor’s budget share, the effort level and the realization of the signal.
Lemma 1 In the solution to Problem 1, 2, or 3, the expected utility conditional
on s for the investor is given by
(7) log
(
Bi(s)
fω(ω) + ε(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω))
p(ω)
)
where
(8) Bi(s) = w0 −
∫
exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)dω
is the investor’s budget share. Therefore, the indirect utility function can be sub-
stituted for the original objective in these problems.
PROOF Note that the choice of investor utilities ui(s, ω) only appears in Prob-
lems 1, 2, and 3 in the objective function (2) and in the budget constraint (3).
Therefore, the optimal solution must solve the subproblem of maximizing (2) sub-
ject to (3). The first-order condition of this problem is
(9) [εf I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω)] f s(s) = λB(s)p(ω) exp(ui(s, ω))
where λB(s) is the multiplier of the budget constraint. Integrating the above with
respect to ω and rearranging gives
λB(s) =
f s(s)
Bi(s)
which can be substituted back into the first-order condition to give (7).
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Equation (7) can be taken to be an application of the usual formula for optimal
consumption given log utility and complete markets (in this case conditional on
s). The gross portfolio return
(10) RP ≡ εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω)
p(ω)
is optimal for a log investor conditional on observing s.
A related gross portfolio return
(11) RB ≡ f
ω(ω)
p(ω)
is optimal for a log investor who does not observe s. We will refer to this portfolio
as the benchmark portfolio, motivated by the fact that benchmark portfolios in
practice are intended to be sensible passively-managed portfolios.
Using lemma 1 we can compute the investor’s expected utility as
(12)
∫
log
(
w0 −
∫
exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)dω
)
f s(s)ds
+
∫∫
log
(
εf I(ω|s) + (1−ε)fω(ω)
p(ω)
)
(εf I(s, ω)+ (1−ε)f ε(ω)f s(s))dsdω
Note that the second term depends only on effort, ε, and not on the manager’s
utilities. This means we can ignore this term when solving the problem of what
contract will implement a particular effort level and take it into consideration only
when optimizing over effort levels. Note also that the first term is concave in the
manager’s utilities. We will assume the second term is finite for all effort levels
ε to avoid some technical difficulties that are far from the main concerns of our
paper.
There is no incentive-compatibility constraint in the first-best (the ideal situation
in which the manager’s choices can be dictated). In solving the second-best and
third-best problems we desire a more convenient characterization of the incentive-
compatibility constraints. We shall adopt what is known as the first-order ap-
proach of Holmstro¨m (1979) to solving principal-agent problems. In the first-
order approach, the optimization in each incentive-compatibility condition is re-
placed by its first-order condition. The manager is the agent in this case and the
manager’s choice problem is
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Problem 4 (Manager’s Problem) Choose an effort level ε′ and a reporting strat-
egy ρ(s) to maximize
(13)
∫∫
um(ρ(s), ω)(ε
′f I(ω|s) + (1− ε′)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε′)
Substituting the first-order conditions of this problem, evaluated at ε′ = ε and
ρ(s) = s for the incentive-compatibility contraints, we obtain the first-order ver-
sion of the third-best problem:
Problem 5 (First-order Third-best) Choose ε and um(s, ω) to maximize
(14)
∫
log
(
w0 −
∫
exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)dω
)
f s(s)ds+K(ε)
subject to manager participation
(15)
∫∫
um(s, ω)(εf
I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dωds− c(ε) = u0,
incentive-compatibility of effort choice
(16)
∫∫
um(s, ω)(f
I(ω|s)− fω(ω))f s(s)dsdω − c′(ε) = 0,
and incentive-compatibility of truthful reporting
(17)
∫
∂um(s, ω)
∂s
(εf I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))f s(s)dω = 0.
(K(ε) is the second term of the investor’s expected utility function in (12) that
doesn’t depend on manager utilities.)
The incentive-compatibility of truthful reporting condition (17) assumes that the
support of s is a continuum of values so that a derivative is appropriate. If s is
discrete, then there would be a finite difference condition instead.
In the first-order second-best problem, truthful reporting of the state is assumed
not to be a problem, so we only impose incentive-compatibility of effort:
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Problem 6 (First-order Second-best) Choose ε and um(s, ω) to maximize the in-
vestor’s indirect utility (14) subjective to manager participation (15) and incentive-
compatibility of effort (16).
The first-order version of the first-best problem is the same as the original version.
II Contracts
We now describe the solutions to each of the three problems stated above. We
begin with the simplest problem, the first-best. Then we demonstrate the impact
of the agency problems by showing how the solution changes as we add incentive
compatibility constraints in the second-best and third-best.
First-best In a first-best contract we expect to find that there is optimal risk shar-
ing between the manager and the investor. This means that the marginal utility of
wealth for the manager should be proportional to the investor’s marginal utility in
all states.
The first-order condition for um is
(18) exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)
Bi(s)
= λR(f
ω(ω) + ε(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω)))
where λR is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint. Multiplying
both sides by Bi(s) and integrating both sides with respect to ω we obtain
(19) Bm(s) = λRBi(s).
Since the two budget shares must sum to w0 we have
(20) Bi(s) = w0
1 + λR
from which we obtain
(21) um(s, ω) = log
(
w0λR
1 + λR
fω(ω) + ε(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω))
p(ω)
)
.
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or equivalently the manager’s fee is
(22) φ(s, ω) = w0λR
1 + λR
RP ,
since um(s, ω) = log(φ(s, ω)). Comparing this with equation (7), substituting the
definition of Bi(s) from above, we see that the first-best contract is a sharing rule
which gives the manager a fixed proportion of the payoff of the portfolio indepen-
dent of the signal. So, as expected, optimal risk sharing obtains. It is worth noting
that this result does not depend on the mixture distribution assumption. A pro-
portional sharing rule would still be the first-best contract even under alternative
distributional assumptions.
We have not solved for the Lagrange multiplier λR, but it is easy to do so by
substituting the manager’s fee (22) into the reservation utility contraint (15).
As mentioned above, the first-best contract assumes that moral hazard and adverse
selection are not a problem, that the effort the manager exerts and the signal the
manager observes (not just what is reported) can be contracted upon. However it
turns out that even if truthful reporting of the signal cannot be verified the manager
will still report truthfully, a result that can be seen as consistent with the notion of
preference similarity described by Ross (1974, 1979). In other words a manager
who is constrained to take the first-best effort and is faced with a contract of the
form (21) will choose to report the signal honestly. Since the budget share does
not depend on the reported signal. Misreporting will only affect RP . But RP is
the gross return on an optimal portfolio for a log investor. Misreporting the signal
can only make the manager worse off because it is equivalent to the choice of a
suboptimal portfolio.
Connecting the contract in a single-period model with the actual multiperiod econ-
omy should not be oversold. However, it is worth observing that this contract
resembles the commonly-observed contract paying a fixed proportion of funds
under management. Of course, the implications of this contract may be a lot dif-
ferent in our single-period model than in a multiperiod world in which the amount
of funds under management can depend on past performance.
Second-best In a second-best world, effort is not observable so the contract must
be incentive-compatible for effort.
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Proposition 1 The second-best contract gives the manager a payoff which is pro-
portional to the investor’s payoff plus a bonus that is proportional to the excess
return of the portfolio over the benchmark:
φ(s, ω) = Bm(R
P + k(RP −RB))
where Bm and k are non-negative constants.
PROOF We will work with the first-order version of the problem. Here, the first-
order condition for um(s, ω) is
exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)
Bi(s)
= λR(f
ω(ω) + ε(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω)))(23)
+λa(f
I(ω|s)− fω(ω))
where λa is the Lagrange multiplier on the IC-effort constraint. Proceeding as in
the derivation of the first-best case we find that the budget shares are of the same
form as in the first-best contract so that we obtain
(24) um(s, ω) = log
(
w0λR
(1 + λR)
fω(ω) + (ε+ λa
λR
)(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω))
p(ω)
)
or equivalently the manager’s fee is
(25) φ(s, ω) = BA (RP + k(RP −RB))
where
(26) k = λa
ελR
≥ 0.
The difference between this contract and the first-best contract is that the second-
best contract gives the manager a “bonus” that is proportional to the excess return
of the fund over a benchmark in addition to a fraction of end-of-period assets
under management. This suggests using excess returns over a benchmark as a
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measure of portfolio performance. This is intriguing since measuring portfolio
performance relative to a benchmark is common practice in the portfolio manage-
ment industry.
The mixture model assumption plays two roles in this analysis. First, as noted in
the literature, it implies that any first-order solution is a solution of the underlying
agency model. Second, the mixture model assumption implies that the benchmark
in the solution can be chosen to be the uninformed optimum.
Absent the mixture model assumption, the optimal contract will include a bonus
that is proportional to the excess return over a benchmark but in general this
benchmark will not be the uninformed optimum and it may depend on the re-
ported signal. Let f(ω|s; ε) be the conditional distribution of the market state
given the signal. If this distribution is differentiable in effort and the first-order
approach is still valid then the first-order condition for um(s, ω) is
(27) exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)
Bi(s)
= λRf(ω|s; ε) + λafε(ω|s; ε)
where the subscript indicates partial derivative. When we multiply both sides by
state prices and integrate with respect to market states the term involving λa drops
out because f(ω|s; ε) integrates to one for all s and we can interchange the order
of integration and differentiation. So the budget share is constant and is of the
same form as in the first-best case. The random variable
Z ≡ λafε(ω|s; ε)
p(ω)
is a zero cost payoff. Because of complete markets this random variable is some
excess return. We can take this random excess return to be the excess return of the
managed portfolio over some other portfolio return defined by
RO = RP − Z.
The managers payoff is
φ(s, ω) = BA
[
RP + k′
(
RP −RO)]
where k′ = λa/λR. In general of course this “benchmark” RO will not be the
uninformed optimum because it will be some function of s, the reported signal
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(which is okay since the signal is observed in the second-best, but not consistent
with the usual choice of a benchmark in practice as an uninformed portfolio).
If the first-order approach fails and there are non-locally-binding incentive com-
patibility constraints then a similar expression can be derived. The general first-
order condition for the principal’s problem may put weights on both local and
non-local changes. Combining the weighted average of the corresponding den-
sity changes from the optimum and dividing by p(ω) gives the appropriate change
from the optimum to the benchmark.
In one of the numerical examples, the solution is almost the same
Third-best The third-best contract solves Problem 5. The first-order condition for
um is
exp(um(s, ω))p(ω)
Bi(s)
= λR(f
ω(ω) + ε(f I(ω|s)− fω(ω)))(28)
+λa(f
I(ω|s)− fω(ω))− ελs(s)∂f
I(ω|s)
∂s
−λ′s(s)(εf I(ω|s) + (1− ε)fω(ω))
where λs(s) is the Lagrange multiplier on the truthful reporting constraint. In this
case we have
(29) Bi(s) = w0
1 + λR − λ′s(s)fs(s)
and
(30) Bm(s) =
w0(λR − λ′s(s)fs(s))
1 + λR − λ′s(s)fs(s)
.
It does not seem possible to solve for λs(s) (or the fee φ(s, ω) = exp(um(s, ω)))
analytically. Nor indeed is it even clear that a solution which satisfies this first-
order condition would be solution to the problem because the manager’s objective
is not concave in general so the the first-order approach is not valid. To see this
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note that for a fixed reporting strategy (for example, when the correct signal is
known in the second-best), the double integral in the manager’s objective function
(13) is affine (linear plus a constant), so that convexity of the cost function implies
that the overall objective is concave. However, in the third-best the manager can
vary the reporting strategy. In this case, the maximum across reporting strategies
of the double integral is the maximum of affine functions and is therefore con-
vex. In this case, the curvature in the cost function may or may not overcome the
curvature in the optimized double integral. If not, the objective function fails to
be concave and the first-order conditions may fail to characterize the incentive-
compatibility constraint.8 For example, in the limiting case of a proportional cost
function, the objective is convex in effort (once we have optimized over report-
ing strategy), and the manager will never choose an interior effort level. In this
case, any binding incentive-compatibility constraint will compare full effort with
no effort, and will not be the same as the local condition. Numerical examples
presented in an earlier draft confirm that there are cases in which the first-order
approach works and cases in which the first-order approach fails.
What does seem clear from the first-order condition above is that none of the sim-
ple contractual forms we are familiar with from theory or from real-world con-
tracts would solve this problem. Numerical results (included in some detail in an
early unpublished version) suggest that compared to the second-best contract the
third-best contract must provide extra rewards for reporting more extreme signals.
The intuition for this is straightforward. In order to induce effort the manager is
overexposed to the risk of the signal as in the bonus of the second-best contract.
However a manager who may misreport will tend to try and report a signal which
is too conservative in order to try and reduce this risk exposure. This may be re-
lated to plan sponsors’ common concern that managers might be “closet indexers”
who mimic the index but collect fees more appropriate for active managers.
Conceptually, the third-best model seems more compelling than the first- and
second-best models because effort is probably not contractible and the manager’s
beliefs after exerting effort are not publicly verifiable. Nonetheless, explicit con-
tracts observed in practice seem to look like our first- and second-best solutions:
8Matters are actually somewhat more subtle than what is described in the text since the utility
levels in the double integral are endogenous to the investor’s choice problem. Therefore, we cannot
specify a priori a level of convexity in the cost function c(·) large enough to ensure the manager’s
objective function is concave, since concavity still depends on the investor’s specification of utility
payoffs.
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fees based on a proportion of assets under management (as in the first-best), with
or without additional compensation based on performance relative a benchmark
(as in the second-best), are common, while explicit contracts that compensate di-
rectly for taking more extreme positions (as in our third-best solution) are not.
There are several possible explanations for this apparent inconsistency between
theory and practice. All of these explanations are outside the scope of our model,
and we do not have strong views about which explanation is most accurate.
One possible explanation is that the first- and second-best problems are better
representations of the underlying economic problem, perhaps because there is a
mechanism outside the model for handling the problem of truthful reporting or
closet indexing. For example, perhaps site visits to the manager and examination
of the records assure the investor that the manager is investing as intended. Or, it
could be a reputation effect: we do observe monitoring for closet indexing in the
hiring of managers, and this monitoring may produce a reputation-based incentive
for taking the requisite risk. In general, there seems to be no reason to expect that
alternative mechanisms will generate the correct incentives.
A second possible explanation is that there is some psychological reason that peo-
ple do not behave as in the third-best. For example, perhaps investors and man-
agers do not realize there is an incentive problem. Or, managers may like the
feeling of honestly mapping the information into the signal while promises of
effort are necessarily vague and underexertion of effort may be easier to rational-
ize. These explanations are not very useful as theory, since having this kind of
explanation does not seem to put any restriction on behavior.
A third possible explanation (not inconsistent with the other two) is that perhaps
the incentive to misreport in practice is small. In our numerical results, several
choices of parameter values consistent with the first-order approach generated
third-order solutions that were close numerically to the second-best, especially
for parameter values for which the manager’s information is not very informa-
tive about the market state (consistent with our priors that the market is not too
inefficient).
At this point, we do not have a favorite explanation (or even a comprehensive list
of explanations) for the apparent inconsistency between our theoretical sensibil-
ities (which suggest the third-best is the “correct” analysis) and practice (which
looks a lot like our first- and second-best solutions). We hope that future models
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or empirical work improve our understanding of this issue.
III Conclusion
We have proposed a new model of optimal contracting in the agency problem in
delegated portfolio management. We have shown that in a first-best world with
log utility the optimal contract is a proportional sharing rule over the portfolio
payoff. In a second-best world the optimal contract (if it exists) is a proportional
sharing rule plus a bonuse proportional to the excess return over a benchmark to
give incentives to the manager to work hard. In a third-best world, such excess
return strategies will provide incentives to work but will tend to make the manager
overly conservative. These results have been demonstrated in the context of a real-
istic return model and the derived performance measurement criterion looks more
like the simple benchmark comparisons used by practitioners than more elaborate
measures such as the Jensen measure, Sharpe measure, or various marginal-utility
weighted measures. In addition, the optimal contract includes restrictions on the
set of permitted strategies. These institutional features are more similar to practice
than other existing agency models in finance.
We have only just started to tap the potential of this framework to tell us about
agency problems in portfolio management. Although some of the general results
extend to stock selection models as well as the market timing examples given
in this paper, it would be interesting to see the exact form of the contracts for
stock-pickers. Analyzing career concerns would be an interesting variant: in this
case, the current client has to take as given the manager’s incentives to demon-
strate superior performance this period in order to attract new clients or achieve
a larger wage next period. In this case, there is probably a limit to the extent to
which the client can neutralize the impact of career concerns. It would also be
interesting to consider problems in which the manager’s utility function (as well
as consumption) is bounded below, given that the actual economy has restrictions
on indentured servitude. Rajan and Srivastava (2000) considers a simple model of
delegated portfolio management with limited punishment. It would be interesting
to see what limited punishment or career concerns would imply in our model.
In the model, we have obtained a lot of mileage from the transparent and fric-
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tionless markets assumption that allows us to look at an equivalent formulation
in which the manager simply reports information and does not actually manage
the money. However, there are aspects of performance (such as quality of ex-
ecution) that are not handled adequately in this way. While institutions receive
complete reports of which trades were made (and mutual fund performance re-
ports can depend in this information in any necessary way as computed credibly
by the custodian or consultant), even the full trade record combined with full quote
and trade histories of each stock would not necessarily tell us what trading oppor-
tunities were available at each point in time. It would be useful to have a fuller
exploration of when the reporting formulation is equivalent and of what happens
otherwise. Another extension would include explicitly the two levels of portfolio
management we see in practice, with the separation of responsibilities for asset
allocation across asset classes and management of sub-portfolios in each asset
class. The ultimate beneficiaries have to create incentives for the overall manager
to hire and compensate the asset class managers, and this could be modeled as a
hierarchy of agency contracts.
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